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 ABSTRACT 
 
“Post-crisis banking regulation: the Twin Peaks model” 
By 
Vyshnevskyi Iegor 
 
An undeniable benefit of the recent global financial crisis is that it has shown us not only 
some weak points of the current finance system but also it has drawn our attention to some 
problems which should be solved in order to prevent such failures in the future. Among all 
discussed issues regarding some reformation in the financial sector, the problem of banking 
regulation is the most debated. Although the importance of the banking regulation structure is 
indisputable at this stage, yet the matter “which model of regulation to choose?” is unclear. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to study the effectiveness of the “Twin Peaks” regulation 
model within the banking sector scope across the world. Although the model itself cannot 
guarantee a high quality regulation, as it is just a tool, I believe that using the most effective 
tool improves the standards of banking regulation and supervision across the world. In my 
paper I have done an empirical analysis of the relationship between the banking regulation 
quality and the banking supervision architecture. In particular, I have studied the impact of the 
use of the “Twin Peaks” model on the banking supervision performance. For the sake of 
measuring supervision performance I used (not unique but still) a rather useful approach of 
measuring by aggregate indexes.   
Although this research partly continues the studies of Čihák and Podpiera (2006, 2007, 
2008), Kremers and Schoenmaker (2003, 2010), Masciandaro (2006) and others; the exam-
ined issue of the paper is studied in a different way than it was before. In addition, the data of 
143 countries, considerably expanded dataset compared to existing studies, has been analyzed.  
 What is the practical implication of the “Twin Peaks” model? How effective is the model? 
I have found that on average using of the model is associated with the higher quality of the 
banking regulation only partly though the particular practice of the model in Australia and the 
Netherlands is positive. The results of the study show that the only two measures of banking 
regulation quality have economically significant relationship with the model. This result con-
tradicts my expectations and other scholars’ findings. Furthermore, I have found that some 
other factors, in addition to the supervision structure, have a significant impact on the quality 
of banking regulation. Such factors are needed to be studied further. 
In such a case, before launching any kind of policy regarding banking regulation structure, 
in my opinion, this issue should be studied further and examined by using additional (as pre-
cise as possible) factors as explanatory measures of the banking regulation quality.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Statement of the problem” 
"Banks have done more injury to the religion, morality, tranquility, prosperity, 
and even wealth of the nation than they can have done or ever will do good."1- John Adams 
 
A wise person differs from an ordinary one by the ability to learn from mistakes. Taking 
into account past economic turbulence, an obvious question arises: “Are the people responsi-
ble for the soundness and wisdom of the global economy, wise?,” or to be more precise, “Are 
they wise enough to take lessons from recent mistakes occurred in the global economy?”The 
answer to that question, as well as to the other ones related to economic issues, has to be giv-
en by economists –the ones responsible for analyzing the past economic performance, esti-
mating the influence of some processes on the economy and making predictions about the fu-
ture behavior of the economy. In order to fulfill all their duties (for instance, to help us to un-
derstand what is happening, to explain to us what is crucial in the global economy) econo-
mists need to be wise. The question now appears to be whether economists are wise enough to 
admit their own mistakes, and what is more important, prevent their future repetition. In simi-
lar vein, we can ask economists another question, in particular, whether they will prefer to 
keep following blindly the economic postulates of their seniors without understanding that a 
fast-changing character of the economy demands some regular changes in the practice of the 
economics profession. And the truth is that the last economic downturn has only enlarged the 
number of questions the society is willing to pose to economists. A long time ago Thomas 
Carlyle, a historian, criticized Thomas Malthus for his gloomy prediction of starvation level, 
increasing due to fast population growth exceeding the growth of the food supply. Carlyle 
                                                          
1John Adams, (1735-1826) Founding Father, 2nd US President, John Adams letter to John Taylor, Of Caroline, 
Quincy, 12 March, 1819 http://books.google.com/books?id=EFkSAAAAYAAJ&lpg=PA375&ots=xh-
6ooA5Mu&pg=PA375#v=onepage&q&f=false 
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called economics “the dismal science.”2 Probably since that time economics has gone to an 
extreme side and has become “the bright science.” In fact, now world society needs econom-
ics finally to be “the balanced science.”  
An undeniable benefit of the recent global financial crisis is that it has shown us not only 
some weak points of the current finance system but also it has drawn our attention to some 
problems which should be solved in order to prevent such failures in the future. Different 
scholars, due to their specialization, see such problems in a different way. For instance, some 
of them focus on the problem of underestimating the impact of financial intermediates/agents 
on the economy.3In their opinions, currently governments and central banks are using macro-
economics models, known as ‘dynamic stochastic general equilibrium’ (DSGE) models, 
which do not include either banks or other financial agents. They actually do not include fi-
nancial systems as such at all. So, there is a question -- how can the impact of a thing which 
does not exist be forecast and controlled? Paul Krugman identified a complex of problems 
that arose due to financial liberalization. At the same time he admitted the failure of econo-
mists to predict the coming crisis due to the fact that in their economy models,  
They turned a blind eye to the limitations of human rationality that often lead to bub-
bles and busts; to the problems of institutions that run amok; to the imperfections of 
markets — especially financial markets — that can cause the economy’s operating 
system to undergo sudden, unpredictable crashes; and to the dangers created when 
regulators don’t believe in regulation.4 
                                                          
2"Dismal Science Definition | Investopedia."Investopedia - Educating the world about finance. N.p., n.d. Web. 
21 July 2013. <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dismalscience.asp>. 
3“New model army,” The Economist, January 19, 2013 http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21569752-efforts-are-under-way-improve-macroeconomic-models-new-model-army. 
4Paul Kraugman, “How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?,” The New York Times, September,2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
3 
 
In addition, the crisis has brought up talks about corruption in the financial sector to a new 
level. For example, the authors of the documentary movie Inside Job5 have studied the prob-
lem of the strong lobbying of financial sector interests by policymakers. As a result we have a 
financial liberalization and deregulation. Moreover, as it appeared, financial institutions were 
promoting theoretical ideas profitable for them, through some economists, of the necessity of 
the financial sector’s deregulation in order to have a theoretical proof of easing of economic 
regulation and supervision. In fact, it is not nearly the whole list of problems which were dis-
covered during the crisis. And in such a way economists not only discredited themselves and 
lost credibility for their profession, they misled the entire financial system by having given 
the wrong theoretical implications of the events which were taking place. In this context, the 
failure of regulators to prevent and to overcome the crisis is not that terrible (which, by no 
means, can excuse them). How could they effectively fight against the crisis relying on the 
wrong theoretical base?  
Thus, while the process of reframing the place of finance in economic theory is going on 
we should remember more practical issues that are essential these days.  As it was stressed in 
the 2009 report, “Financial reform: a framework for financial stability” by G-306 (the working 
group on Finance Reform of Group of Thirty), one should focus on the way to arrange the fi-
nancial system’s structure in post-crisis time to achieve soundness and stability.7Although the 
crisis outcome and the main causes have not been overcome yet, the world financial authori-
ties have taken this issue seriously by starting full-scale reforms of the financial sector. Finan-
cial regulatory agencies have appeared at the forefront of those changes, partly due to their 
                                                          
5”Inside Job is a documentary movie directed by Charles H. Ferguson. The film is described by Ferguson as be-
ing about "the systemic corruption of the United States by the financial services industry and the consequences 
of that systemic corruption," taken from Charles Ferguson’s interview with Charlie Rose, 
YouTube.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vS0hj4kiqsA. 
6«The Group of Thirty is a private, nonprofit, international body composed of very senior representatives of the 
private and public sectors and academia.» taken from G-30 official website: http://www.group30.org/. 
7Working Group on Financial Reform of Group of Thirty, Financial reform: a framework for financial stability, 
2009.http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/Financial_Reform-A_Framework_for_Financial_Stability.pdf. 
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failures during the crisis and partly because during those days their structural models actually 
did not help get through the crisis. In fact, there is a process that started worldwide in 1995 in 
the UK that focuses on finding the most suitable model to face the current challenges of the 
financial system and at the same time provides a path to sustainable economic growth in the 
future. 
In addition, G-30 has studied “various national supervisory and regulatory approaches” 
which “… set out to look at the changes evident in the financial markets and the evolution of 
the national supervisory architecture at[the] time when central banks and supervisory agencies 
[had been seeking] to improve their supervisory processes in light of blurring of lines between 
different financial sectors and businesses.”8According to the research of 2008, the “Twin 
Peaks” regulatory and supervisory model was emphasized as “the optimal means of ensuring 
[that] issues of transparency, market integrity, and consumer protection receive sufficient pri-
ority,”9 i.e., as one of the most effective models to manage financial systems’ risks in the 
world. Such an approach, "…a form of [financial] regulation by objective, is one in which 
there is a separation of regulatory functions between two regulators [i.e. two agencies]: one 
that performs the safety and soundness supervision function and the other that focuses on 
conduct-of-business regulation.”10Moreover, it is known that countries such as Australia, the 
Netherlands with this supervisory model “in use” were least affected by the global financial 
crisis. In addition, the UK authority has already implemented the model; South Africa is go-
ing to set it up.  
“Main claim” 
                                                          
8Working Group on Financial Supervision of Group of Thirty, The Structure of Financial Supervsion: Approaches 
and Challenges in a Global Marketplace, 2008. 
http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/The%20Structure%20of%20Financial%20Supervision.pdf 
9 Mike Taylor, “Twin Peaks regulatory model a winner”, Super Review, 2008, 
http://www.superreview.com.au/news/regulation/twin-peaks-regulatory-model-a-winner. 
10Working Group on Financial Supervision, The Structure of Financial Supervision,13. 
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Discussions of the “Twin Peaks” regulatory model have been going on since 1995 after 
Michael Taylor theoretically systematized its main points in his paper.11 Since that time the 
model has been implemented in several countries and its results only prove its high effective-
ness. Additionally, some countries, confident that the model works, decided to apply it into 
their financial systems regulation. And although it is worthy to mention that nowadays the 
“Twin Peaks” model is known as the most effective way of managing financial system, only 
deep theoretical and practical analysis of the model’s performance will answer the question 
whether or not this system is the best response to the current challenges in the financial sys-
tem. 
Of course, some will probably disagree with the above assertion. While it is true that func-
tions of two agencies may overlap or the expenses of the supervision are relatively higher, 
however, it does not necessary mean that the “Twin Peaks” model is not effective. In fact, I 
believe that the result of my study will prove the opposite. 
“Sub-claims” and “Research questions” 
Theoretically, separating supervision functions by consumer protection and prudential reg-
ulation approaches (i.e. by objectives) under two separate institutions allows managing almost 
all kinds of risks in a financial system more effectively than combining these two functions 
within one regulatory institution12. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission are examples of such an approach. My 
research thus asks, 
• What is the theoretical implication of the “Twin Peaks” model? 
• What advantages/disadvantages does the model have in theory? 
                                                          
11Michael Taylor, Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century, London: Centre for the Study of Fi-
nancial Innovation, 1995. 
12 Ibid.,4 
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Practically, countries with a functional “Twin Peaks” model were least affected by the 
global financial crisis or overcame the crisis faster. For instance, the Netherlands faced prob-
lems with its own banking system due to the high integration of the Dutch banks into the 
world financial market. Nevertheless, Dutch financial authorities managed to solve those 
problems, to some extent, owing to the “Twin Peaks” model. This suggests a need to investi-
gate such questions as,  
• What is the practical implication of the “Twin Peaks” model? 
• What is the role of the model in getting through the crisis? 
• How effective is the model? 
“A statement of significance”: 
This research is a response to the recent global financial crisis which has forced a funda-
mental reconsideration of the banking regulation as a whole and the banking supervision ar-
chitecture in particular. Generally, the result of this study, in my opinion, can make a signifi-
cant contribution to the theoretical field of banking regulation as well as to the practical one. 
To be more precise, the discovery of the research will allow understanding whether or not the 
“Twin Peaks” regulation and supervision model is really an effective approach to banking 
regulation. The point here is that the theoretical and practical study of the “Twin Peaks” mod-
el should interest those who want to know about one of the main modern trends in the finan-
cial regulation field, and also to understand the nature of this trend and see its further devel-
opment. In addition, results of such analysis could be used by policymakers in the field of fi-
nancial regulation and supervision. The application of the research outputs both in theory and 
practice will enhance the further studying of the model. Beyond this limited audience, howev-
er, in an ideal world, this study should be useful to anyone who is interested in a larger issue 
of achieving financial stability through the banking regulation reform. 
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“Research hypothesis” 
It is hypothesized that there is a positive statistically and economically significant relation-
ship between the model of banking regulation, namely the “Twin Peaks” model, and the 
quality of banking supervision (measured by four indexes).For the sake of either accepting or 
rejecting the hypothesis, I will analyze the theoretical aspects of the model and investigate 
results of the model in several countries in order to estimate its real effectiveness. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
For quite a long period of time until the late fifteenth century,13 economy and finance were 
considered as a single concept. At that time finance was fulfilling its main function to provide 
funds for economic entities, in the purest form. As history has shown, that way did not last 
forever. At the turn of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the UK, the recently formed 
middle class as well as rich people, driven by rising standards of living, demanded some 
products (vehicles) to further enrich their wealth. The financial sector together with the legis-
lative system managed to meet their needs. In its turn, such a large level of demand together 
with an unprecedented capital flow to the sector caused a financial revolution. It was the start 
of changes of the face of finance, equal in significance to the first division of labor process. 
And although economy and finance remained and still remain closely related to each other, 
the character of their relationship has changed. The role of finance has risen significantly. At 
the same time the size of the financial system has been growing rapidly. According to John 
Carswell, such deep changes, backed up by in short followed financial market failures, for 
instance the South Sea bubble,14 turned closer attention to financial sector from an authority. 
The response of UK authority resulted in forming a special committee in the House of Com-
mons in 1720 to investigate the bubble issue.15 Later, in June 1720, based mostly on the 
committee’s suggestions, the Bubble Act was passed. According to this act, a kind of mecha-
nism to protect against bubble anomalies was launched. Until 1825, the time when the Act 
was repealed, no company in the UK could issue stocks without royal charter permission.  
Generally speaking, that stock market crisis only assured that the financial system as well as 
                                                          
13 Geoffrey Poitras and Franck Jovanovic in their article “Pioneers of Financial Economics: Das Adam Smith Ir-
relevanzproblem?” state that the early history of financial economics as a separate part of economic science 
has started in the fifteenth century. 
14A bubble on the UK stock market caused by manipulation with the South Sea company stocks (1719-1720). 
15 John Carswell, The South Sea bubble, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960. 
9 
 
its operation on it should be supervised and monitored. As a result, the system of financial 
supervision was deepened and improved. From that point all changes in the finance sector 
sooner or later have been accompanied by relative changes in financial supervision. Usually 
such changes in regulation are being made later as a response to some markets’ changes (fail-
ures).  
In fact, launching of particularly banking regulation and supervisions happened a bit later 
than banking, as a separate type of financial business, had obtained its modern characteristics. 
Banks, since their creation in the fifteenth century, as private commercial institutions, were 
ruled by general sets of laws, norms and principles applicable to any other commercial firms16. 
Even after almost all countries created their own banks, in order to supply domestic curren-
cies and be as financial agents of Governments, that time nationals banks did not perform as 
regulators until the moment when banks started to be considered as specific kind of commer-
cial companies what require a unique norms of regulation. It was caused more by the overall 
development of society than by importance of banks’ role. Such development led to the un-
derstanding that every kind of commercial activity should be specified by law and regulated 
by norms and principles applied to its specific characters. But as it occurred, the way of bank-
ing regulation by general law could not assure the well-behave of banks and safeness& 
soundness of the banking system as well. Frequent banking crisis happened in the USA and 
the UK since the eighteenth until early twentieth centuries has shown the need of setting spe-
cific rules to regulate banks’ activity. Starting from thirties years of the twentieth century 
banking sector became one of the most heavily regulated industry of the economy, and at the 
same time banks are one of the most regulated financial institutions.17 
                                                          
16The ascent of money, directed by Niall Ferguson, London: Chimerica Media Ltd, 2009. 
17Frederic S. Mishkin, The economics of money, banking, and financial markets,9th ed.,Boston: Pearson, 2010. 
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Almost simultaneously financial as a whole and particularly banking regulation and super-
vision have become an object of ongoing research and studies. Debates regarding financial 
regulation in general and forms of financial supervision and its severity in particular have 
never really ended. After every crisis such discussions flare up with renewed vigor. One of 
those who set the tone of contemporary talks about financial regulation and supervision is Dr. 
Charles Goodhart. According to his work, How should we regulate the financial sector?, fi-
nancial regulation has always been characterized by its a-theoretical, highly practical respons-
es of authority on urgent problems to avoid their repeating in future.18 In fact, the struc-
ture/model of the regulation system, which establishes some norms, principles and require-
ments, is strongly dependent on understanding what supervision should accomplish. For a 
long time the individual risk of institutions has been understood as potentially the biggest 
danger to the stability of the financial system. Consequently, the past system was built in a 
way to minimize that kind of risk. But as practice has shown, the focus of the supervision on 
the individual risk of institutions, rather than on systemic risk, has caused further system fail-
ure. Goodhart argues that in such a way past financial supervision was badly designed and 
showed its inability to guarantee the soundness of the financial system. Contemporary super-
vision, in his opinion, should mainly pay attention to systemic externalities and to consumer 
protection. Moreover, I found significant that Goodhart has posited the idea of “paradigm 
shift,”19 i.e. the needs of fundamental changes in authorities’ understanding the purpose of 
financial supervision. Hence, such reconsideration of financial supervision goals will cause 
changes in the regulation tools, i.e. it will transform financial regulation structure/model. It is 
true to say that related Goodhart’s work makes a great contribution to the study of financial 
supervision though it is a bit theoretical, and requires some empirical evidence.  
                                                          
18 Adair Turner and others (2010),   The Future of Finance: The LSE Report, Chapter 5, How should we regulate 
the financial sector?, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
19 Ibid.,179. 
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It is interesting to mention that according to Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintynthe 
changes in banking regulation architecture were happening often, as responses to financial 
markets’ failures or structural changes on markets. They empirically analyzed the evolution of 
different countries’ regulation systems during 1998 – 2008 years in the paper After the Big 
Bang and Before the Next One? Reforming the Financial Supervision Architecture and the 
Role of the Central Bank. A Review of Worldwide Trends, Causes and Effects (1998-2008). 
Scholars concluded that there was a trend of structural changes in banking regulation and su-
pervision. Particularly it was a start of shifting from the sectoral model of regulation to the 
unified (integrated) model. As an outcome of that wave of reform there was the supervision 
landscape which was diversified to such an extent as never before. Although the main push to 
widespread reforms worldwide came from the UK, where in 1998 the Financial Services Au-
thority was established, this country was not the first one to set up new model. According to 
the paper, the Scandinavian countries, Norway, Island, Denmark and Sweden performed 
changes in their banking regulation and supervision models in the late eighties – early nineties 
of twenties century. In addition, Masciandaro and Quintyn mentioned that due to recent glob-
al financial crisis the reforms in banking regulation and supervision structure would keep go-
ing with shifts to models which would be able to provide regulators with exhaustive and up-
to-date market information.  
The high importance of the regulation system structure was considered by the whole world 
society. Scholars, international organizations and policy makers have been wondering about 
the role of an appropriate supervisory structure in assuring soundness of the financial system. 
Among other outstanding research, a great role in studying this issue has been played by the 
World Bank’s conferences, researches and papers. Based on the results of the World Bank 
conference “Aligning Financial Supervisory Structures with Country Needs” December 4-5, 
2003 (with more than 70 participants from 52 countries) the eponymously-named book was 
12 
 
edited by Jeffrey Carmichael, Alexander Fleming and David T. Llewellyn.20 Authors, sum-
ming up the information presented at the conference, conclude that the majority of countries 
consider the structure of supervision and regulation as the main aspect of their efficiency and 
effectiveness. Another important issue mentioned in the book is the fact that although there is 
no structural model which suits every country perfectly, two polar approaches to build the su-
pervision structure were indicated. On the one hand is a traditional sector-by-sector supervi-
sion; on the other hand, a full sectoral integration approach. In fact, developed countries have 
tended to have integrated supervision. Meanwhile developing countries favor sectoral finan-
cial regulation. There is a need to point out that the structure of the regulation, as authors ob-
served, also highly depends on the cultural and legal heritage of a country. Besides, there is 
room for some hardly predicted factors which at the end could have some impact on financial 
regulation models, as authors point out (for instance the wish of authority to minimize the ex-
penses on financial regulation structure).  
One of the reviewers of a“Aligning Financial Supervisory Structures with Country Needs” 
book’s manuscript, Michael Taylor, is also a well-known scholar in the supervision structure 
field. He was one of the first ones to study the issue of the banking regulation and supervision 
structure modernization. In 1995 he wrote a report about the “Twin Peaks” regulation model 
where he outlined the main theoretical aspects of the model, and offered how it could be used 
in practice in the UK. He also predicted the future of financial supervision.21 In addition, Tay-
lor forecasted the ineffectiveness of combining prudential and consumer protection regulation 
under one institution’s roof. Eventually this report became a must-read book and a common 
source for references. Recent global financial crises together with high attention to the issue 
                                                          
20 Jeffrey Carmichael et al., Aligning financial supervisory structures with country needs, Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank Institute, 2004. 
21 Michael Taylor, Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century, London: Centre for the Study of Fi-
nancial Innovation, 1995. 
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of financial supervision structures have made Taylor join the debate about an optimal finan-
cial supervision structure.22 Taylor’s main observation, which has become a well-respected 
principle, is that the supervision structure should fully reflect the processes going on within 
the financial sector. He argues that traditional sectoral supervision is no longer effective 
enough to regulate the financial sector because of the integration of the securities, banking 
and insurance markets. Taylor suggests regulation by “objectives.” For this purpose, in his 
opinion, the “Twin Peaks” model works best. He considers two main objectives of the model, 
regardless of the part of financial sector. The first one is to guarantee the soundness and sta-
bility of the whole financial system. The second one is to protect the customers. Special atten-
tion, according to Taylor, should be turned to the “too big to fail” (hereafter TBTF) institu-
tions and to the large and complex financial institutions (hereafter LCFIs).23 He sees the solu-
tion of this matter in imposing a special systematic risk tax on such TBTF and LCFI firms. At 
the same time, the main capital requirements for such institutions should be higher than for 
others. In addition, he argues that LCFI institutions should be supervised by slightly different 
prudential norms than other firms. Although Taylor has done quite a full theoretical analysis 
of the model, he has used no empirical (quantitative) evidence to prove his point of view. In 
fact, it makes his research incomplete, in my opinion. 
Among all sources, the Structure of financial supervision: Approaches and challenges in a 
global market place report of G-30 should be emphasized. This report is dedicated to the 
study of some national supervisory and regulatory approaches. Starting the review in July 
2007, G-30 wanted to see into evolution of nationals’ regulation structures. The Group ob-
                                                          
22 Michael Taylor, Twin Peaks Revisited: A Second Chance for Regulatory Reform, London: Centre for the Study 
of Financial Innovation, September 2009. 
23 TBTF is a colloquium name for financial institutions, which bankruptcy can cause a crash of whole financial 
system, due to their sizes, "Too Big To Fail Definition | Investopedia." Investopedia - Educating the world about 
finance. http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/too-big-to-fail.asp (accessed July 22, 2013). LCFI are financial 
institutions which, due to consolidation of financial sectors, have transcended national boundaries. Thus, their 
activity and conditions can influence not only the domestic market. Appearance of such institutions was men-
tioned in the Report on consolidation in the financial sector, Group of Ten, 2001.  
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served that although supervision systems in different countries were dealing with similar is-
sues their approaches were different. It was caused by historical, political, cultural, economi-
cal and financial dissimilarities of every country.  
The study separates four models of financial regulation using across the globe, namely in-
stitutional functional, integrated and “Twin Peaks” approaches.24  According to the report, the 
interest in the “Twin Peaks” approach is growing fast. In fact, such kind of regulation in-
cludes a lot of benefits over other approaches. The report mentioned that “The Twin Peaks 
approach may also be the optimal means of ensuring that issues of transparency, market integ-
rity, and consumer protection receive sufficient priority.”25The model bases on a principle of 
objective supervising. The regulatory functions are separated between two institutions; one is 
in charge of safety and soundness supervision and another one is responsible for performing 
conduct-of-business regulation. In addition, retail and wholesale activity are separated. More-
over, retail activity is regulated by conduct-of-business supervisor.  
Australia was the first country to implement the “Twin Peaks” model. Since 1997 the 
country has split conduct-of-business and prudential regulations. In such a way, the Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (hereafter APRA) regulates the activity of deposit-taking in-
stitutions. It focuses on safety and soundness of regulated entities. Besides, APRA does not 
depend in its activity on the central bank. The business conduct supervisor in Australia is 
Australian Security and Investment Commission (hereafter - ASIC). It is in charge of con-
sumer protection and market integrity across Australian financial system. In this supervision 
system, the central bank of Australia, Australian Reserve Bank, is responsible for financial 
stability, payment systems and interest rates. In fact, the Australian financial regulation model 
is known as the most appropriate example of practical using the “Twin Peaks” model.  
                                                          
24Group of Thirty, The Structure of Financial Supervision,18 
25Ibid., 38. 
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Furthermore, the OECD report, The financial crisis. Reform and exit strategies, is support-
ing the above assertion of G-20 that after the crisis many countries’ authorities decided to re-
form their banking regulation architecture to the “Twin Peaks” model. In accordance with the 
organization view – the model became a benchmark for a wise and rational banking regula-
tion and supervision structure.   
The keen interest to the issue of the financial supervision has caused the increase of num-
bers of qualitative studies. Many scholars try to answer the question, Which model to chose?, 
by using quantitative methods. The first ones to research the financial supervision topic, to be 
more precise, integrated financial supervision, were Martin Čihak and Richard Podpiera. 
While working for the International Monetary Fund, they managed, together with World Bank, 
to create a unique data on the quality of regulation around the globe. According to Čihak and 
Podpiera research Integrated financial supervision: which model?, the “Twin Peaks” model’s 
impact on the quality  of supervision in securities and insurance sectors is quite similar to the 
impacts of other financial regulation approaches. Meanwhile, the level of supervisory quality 
in the banking sector on average is higher with the model “in use.” The scholars concluded 
that it is caused by better regulatory practices and rather higher standards of prudential super-
vision under the “Twin Peaks” principles.  
It is worth mentioning that Martin Čihak has not rest on his oars and together with Alexan-
der Tieman has researched the quality of financial sector regulation and supervision around 
the world. 26 Like in case of Čihak previous studies, it is used the unique dataset of countries’ 
compliance with international standards which includes both theoretical information and de-
tailed assessments of the practical implementation of the commonly accepted international 
principles and standards for financial sector regulation and supervision in each country. The 
                                                          
26 Sylvester C. W.Eijffingerand others, Handbook of central banking, financial regulation and supervision: after 
the financial crisis, Chapter 15, Quality of financial sector regulation and supervision around the world Chelten-
ham, Glos, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011. 
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interesting finding is that on average the countries’ regulatory frameworks fulfill the interna-
tional standards for financial sector regulation and supervision to the extent of 75 percent. Al-
so scholars found that there were serious differences in the quality of financial supervision 
and regulation across countries. It could be explained by the level of economic development. 
In fact, quality of financial supervision systems of economies with high- income is higher 
than in low- or medium-income countries though financial regulators in high- income coun-
tries usually have more challenges as their financial systems are more complex.  
As the reviewed literature shows, since the time when financial system emerged as a single 
system, the questions on how to supervise it and what is the most efficient way to do it, have 
generated a considerable interest. Society is united in understanding that there is no ideal su-
pervision concept/model, but at the same time, different countries by different ways come to 
rather similar regulation models. The financial crisis that began in 2007 demonstrated some 
weak points of the banking regulation structure/model. In such a way, the search for a new 
regulation model started; a more appropriate one to the current realities. And today, finding 
the most effective financial supervision model is a high priority task not only for scholars and 
policymakers but for the whole society.  
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III. THEORY AND PRACTISE BEHIND THE TWIN PEAKS 
MODEL  
 
A theory of the “Twin Peaks” model: 
As it was mentioned previously in the literature review, the first theoretical overview of the 
“Twin Peaks” model was done in 1995 by Michael Taylor. This approach appeared as a re-
sponse to financial market developments. As the borders between banking, insurance business 
and securities disappeared what made the traditional sectoral model of regulation useless. At 
that this model was a try to deal with some problems in regulatory system caused  not only 
due to the creation of large financial holdings, but also because of the appearance of new 
types of financial securities/instruments and the bundling and unbundling of various kinds of 
services/products previously offered by institutionally different types of companies.27 
Although some scholars classify the model as a functional approach of financial regulation 
and supervision (for instance Dirk Schoenmaker and Eddy Wymeersch), the majority thinks 
that “Twin Peaks” is a form of regulation by objective (i.e. by the type of market failure the 
regulation is obliged to correct). The main point of objective oriented regulation is to focus on 
a desired outcome or objective through having a suitable regulation structure (see the summa-
rized model of supervision by objectives in Table 1). It gives a measure of flexibility to a reg-
ulator to reach that goal in the best way it seems to be. Thus, this approach is better to re-
sponse to changes on the market. Moreover, the regulation by objectives can provide a syner-
gy effect in financial regulation by consolidating regulatory responsibility in areas and can 
guarantee the higher level of market discipline. 
                                                          
27Heidi M. Schooner and Michael Taylor. Regulation of global banking, principles and policies. Burlington, MA: 
Academic Press, 2010. 
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Table 4 Model of financial service supervision by objectives (source: OECD) 
 
 
Originally, the “Twin Peaks” approach is based on separation of regulation objectives be-
tween safety and soundness of the financial system and conduct-of-business/sales practice (i.e. 
consumer protection). In reality, it is true to say that the number of objectives can be far more 
than two. Some scholars identified four or six goals of financial regulation. But for the sake of 
reducing regulation costs such objectives were separated in two above mentioned groups. In 
order to perform the above goals Taylor offered to appoint two agencies, independent from 
the central bank. Having the objectives in separate regulatory institutions can minimize the 
conflict between the contrasting fields. Because it may happen that prudential mandate con-
flict with the conduct matters, and the authority may give priority to safety and soundness is-
sue as these are closely associated with the stability of the financial sector. However, even 
such separation would not let avoid tensions completely, especially when the prudential issues 
remains to be in priority to consumer protection matters.  
Banking 
Securities 
Insurance 
Pension Funds 
Prudential 
Supervision Agency  
Banking 
Securities 
Insurance 
Pension Funds 
Conduct-of-Business 
Supervision Agency 
 
Payments System Overseer  
Banking 
Securities 
Insurance 
Pension Funds 
payments system oversgight Prudential oversgight Conduct of business; consumer protection 
19 
 
According to Taylor, even when such model is launched the role of central bank remains 
vital though its focus shifts from the soundness of individual institutions to maintaining the 
stability of functioning of sectors of financial market and their interconnections. First of all, 
the central bank keeps fulfilling his function as a main monetary policy authority. At the same 
time the bank starts to behave as a crisis manager if needed. Its second main duty is to do the 
macroprudential regulation and supervision (i.e. to deal with systemic risk, overall financial 
structure, the interest rate, payment systems, etc.) and to coordinate the activity of all regula-
tion agencies. 
It is known that the “Twin Peaks” approach is more specialized than other regulation mod-
el. Separation of regulation objectives between two agencies allows them to hire employees 
with relevant competence for their specific functions.28 For instance, prudential regulator is 
able to hire staff with particular business and financial expertise while conduct-of-business 
regulator focuses on employing enforcement-oriented personal. That would improve the over-
all quality of regulation and supervision.  
As it is implicated in the model – one agency should be responsible for prudential, to be 
more precise microprudential, regulation. It implies the continual financial wellbeings of in-
dividually regulated financial companies. In particular such agency has two main functions. 
First – to promote the safety and soundness of insurers, banks and other financial institutions 
by ensuring that the way financial companies carry out their activity on the market does not 
affect or threaten the stability of whole financial system. Second – to minimize an effect of 
some company’s failure on that stability, if happens. 
In terms of the agency which is in charge of conduct maters –its main goals are to secure 
the protection of the consumers on the financial market (i.e. to deal with the problem of in-
                                                          
28Group of Thirty, The Structure of Financial Supervision, 38 
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formation asymmetry between financial services consumers and financial companies). In ad-
dition, such agency must promote effective and fare competition, and enhance the integrity of 
the financial system. Also the agency should foster the confidence in overall financial system 
(see the summarized model of “classical Twin peaks” approach in Table 2).  
Table 25The«classical Twin Peaks» model's architecture (source: KPMG) 
In fact the effectiveness of the model highly depends on the appropriate governance archi-
tecture where all functions, duties, power and obligations of all regulation agencies should be 
clearly set out. At the same time to utilize the model advantages fully - the communication 
and interaction between agencies and central bank should be permanent and intermutual.  
Bearing in mind the above information about the theoretical base of the model it is possible 
now to sum up the advantages of the model. Firstly, as G-20 indicated in its report, the “Twin 
Peaks” model can ensure the fast and free flow of information between the respective agen-
cies and the central bank as well as the access to the information for the general public (i.e. 
transparency issue).29 Second, the model allows limiting opportunity for regulatory arbitrage 
between similar financial services by implementing the straight and logical norm and rules for 
comparable businesses. Third, owing to the model financial authority can get the real and 
                                                          
29Ibid., 38. 
Banks 
 
Securities 
Insurance 
Pension Funds 
Micro-Prudential 
Supervision Agency  
Banks 
Securities firms 
Insurance 
companies 
Pension Funds 
Conduct-of-Business 
Supervision Agency 
 
Information 
Enhancing financial 
stability by promoting 
the safety and sound-
ness of financial insti-
tutions. 
Enhancing confidence 
in the financial system 
by facilitating efficien-
cy and choice in ser-
vices, securing an ap-
propriate degree of 
protection, and protect-
ing and enhancing the 
integrity of the financial 
system. 
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timely information about the risk arising from the regulated companies. Fourth, such regula-
tion framework implies the clear und understandable objectives of financial regulation and 
supervision (it means that financial authority realizes what objectives of regulation are). Fifth, 
the “Twin Peaks” will enable the regulators better identify the risky activity and put such ac-
tivities to appropriate and proportional to the risk level regulation and supervision norms. 
Sixth, the approach will allow regulators to find the emerging risk to consumers and financial 
stability as early as possible and to eliminate that risk. And last but not least, seventh, “Twin 
Peaks” approach is going in line with all common international principles of financial regula-
tion and supervision. 
Since its appearance the model has experienced several changes and improvements. For in-
stance the concept of separation prudential supervision into macro- and micro- was introduced 
to the model after the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 because before that time the idea of 
macroprudential surveillance had not had any kind of currency.30 Also after 2002 when Dutch 
financial authorities launched their own hybrid modification of the “Twin Peaks” model it 
became clear that the model was enough flexible to any structural reconsideration and re-
mained to perform well. The main improvement to the model was made after the global fi-
nancial crisis 2007-2008. Theoretical and empirical reframing of the role of large financial 
holdings, namely TBTF and LCFI, in crisis made Taylor improve the model. In addition to 
setting up the special tax (you may read about this in the literature review) he offered to estab-
lish a special commission to regulate businesses of TBTF and LCFI. This commission could 
be as a subsidiary to the central bank. At that, such large companies would become to be at 
least triple-regulated. Moreover Taylor mentioned that some financial companies could be 
free of prudential regulation depending on its size. 
                                                          
30Michael Taylor, Welcome to Twin Peaks, Central Banking Journal,August 17, 2010. 
http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking-journal/feature/2042899/welcome-twin-peaks 
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A practice of the “Twin Peaks” model (the Dutch case): 
Although the most popular, successful, well-known and most cited example of implemen-
tation of the model is the Australian case, for my research I used, as the practical example, the 
case of Netherland financial regulation architecture implemented since 2002. In fact, the 
Dutch financial system is more integrated in the global financial market than Australian one, 
what additionally presses the regulation and supervision system. Moreover in the Netherland 
the “Twin Peaks” model passed the examination by the crisis. 
Up to launching the model in 2002 the Dutch regulation and supervision structure was tra-
ditional sectoral-based with a separate supervisor for banking (Netherlands Central Bank), 
insurance and pensions (Pensions and Insurance Supervisor), and securities (Securities Super-
visor which was in charge of conduct-of-business regulation regarding the securities market 
activities) businesses. For the purpose of coordinating of conduct-of-business regulation and 
micro-prudential regulation between the sector-based supervisory agencies in 1999 was spe-
cially established the Council of Financial Supervisors (a kind of cross-sectoral element). Due 
to softening of borders between financial companies, between sectors of the financial market 
and between financial products and services, the capability of such regulation approach fell 
down. The three regulators began to lose their effectiveness.31 During that processes among 
Dutch politicians emerged a consensus that the fundamental reform of the financial regulation 
and supervision structure was necessary. Since that time the core principle of the Netherland 
financial regulation and supervision is that the development of the financial market should be 
reflected by the relevant changes in the regulation and supervision structure as much as possi-
ble.     
                                                          
31Jeroen Kremersand Dirk Schoenmaker, Twin Peaks: Experiences in the Netherlands, LSE financial markets 
group. November 2010. http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingPapers/specialPapers/PDF/SP196.pdf. 
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Thus, the reform with simple objective-based setup was launched (its full implementation 
was finished in 2007). The logic way of transformation was the following. At the beginning, 
Dutch financial authority had some preferences for unified prudential supervision. It was 
caused by the changes in the Dutch financial industry structure.  Following the worldwide 
tendency, large financial holdings were doing their businesses in different sectors of the fi-
nancial market and offering the complex financial services and products that went far beyond 
the traditional sectors’ borders. In that case, bringing the prudential regulation and supervision 
of banks, pension funds, insurers and securities companies under one regulation institution 
seemed to be the only right choice. In addition, this approach also minimized the regulatory 
arbitrage. Such desire to set the objective-based regulation (with separation of prudential and 
conduct-of-business regulation) approach led Dutch public and financial authorities to the 
“Twin Peaks” model.32 At the same time they decided to locate the prudential regulation with-
in Netherlands Central Bank. By doing that, Dutch expected to reach synergies by combining 
prudential regulation and monetary policy. Besides, there is a close association between mac-
roeconomic stability and financial stability. And as the recent global financial crisis has 
shown, the location of the prudential oversight within Netherlands Central Bank enabled to 
have a view on systemic issues across the whole financial market, and react rapidly against 
the crisis.  
Above logic can be explained by two main beliefs of Dutch public and financial authorities. 
First, they were certain that prudential and conduct-of-business were strongly different objec-
tives which required some different set of skills, and different institutional allocation. Second, 
they were certain that financial system stability had to be closely associated with the safeness 
and soundness of individual firms, and also with monetary policy. (Taking into account the 
                                                          
32International Monetary Fund, Country Report No. 11/208, Kingdom of the Netherlands-Netherlands: Publica-
tion of Financial Sector Assessment Program Documentation—Technical Note on Financial Sector Supervision: 
The Twin Peaks Model, Washington, July 2011 
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above mentioned the overall architecture model of the Dutch regulation and supervision sys-
tem is summarized in the following Table 3). 
 Table 3 The Dutch financial regulation and supervision model (Source - IMF) 
The main differences of Dutch “Twin Peaks” model from the classical one is that the func-
tions of prudential (both macro- and micro-) regulation and supervision are performed by the 
Netherlands Central Bank. And a new settled supervisor, the Authority for Financial Markets, 
is in charge of conduct-of-business supervision of all financial institutes on the market. An-
other specific characteristic of the Dutch model is that the central bank and the Authority for 
Financial Markets have quite limited rule-making rights because most norms and principles 
were already indicated in the Act for Financial Supervision (2007). In case there is a need to 
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make some changed in legislation framework – it can be done only by the Decrees of the 
Ministry of Finance.33 
In practice, the information flow and coordination of activities between Netherlands Cen-
tral Bank and the Authority for Financial Markets are regulated by the “Covenant” which 
provides a clear framework for regulators responsibilities, consultation and cooperation be-
tween them. There was also indicated the role of the Netherlands Central Bank as the leading 
agency responsible for overall regulation of financial institutions and the Authority for Finan-
cial Markets as the lead regulatory institute for securities companies. In addition, it was 
agreed that the lead supervisor would take into account the position of another supervisor 
(which also has a veto right). 
Jeroen Kremers and Dirk Schoenmaker, the main architectures of the Dutch financial regu-
lation and supervision structure, outlined two key improvements/achievements to the quality 
of financial regulation and supervision, as a result of the reform. First, owing to the tough 
separation of supervision objectives between regulators, when each institutions got its own 
clearly declared objectives, all straights of these regulators were spent more effectively and 
focused only on their fields in charge respectively. Second, because of setting the prudential 
regulation within Netherlands Central Bank of financial stability issue got more attention 
from the regulator. Also it allowed the central bank to be more effective in doing its monetary 
policy because the feedback from the market came faster.  
The sustainability of the “Twin Peaks” model in the Netherland was only approved by the 
recent crisis. International Monetary Fund in its report about the Dutch financial regulation 
and supervision architecture mentioned that the model was working well during the period of 
global downturn in the world finance. It was achieved owing to the timely decisions making 
                                                          
33Ibid. 
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and partly because of providing information sharing between the agencies. Under the rule of 
the Ministry of Finance, which coordinated the activity of agencies during the crisis, the crisis 
management group was set up with a daily based meeting schedule. It included the repre-
sentatives from all financial regulation agencies. Wherein, owing to the clear agencies respon-
sibilities distribution, the high and effective level of activity coordination was achieved. 
Nonetheless, the crisis has revealed several issues within the model which should be solved 
in order to fully utilize all benefits of the “Twin Peaks”. In part, some weak points in the 
model might occur because of the fact that the transition process to the “Twin Peaks” finished 
only in 2007 (i.e. lack of time for learning processes). First, the prudential regulator relied on 
using “moral suasion” during the crisis which made it less effective compare to those who 
used enforcement powers to the full. Second, the crisis showed the lack of prudential regula-
tion of TBTF and LCFI such as ING Group and Fortis. The numbers of tools to manage them 
were limited. And the main pitfall of the model was demonstrated by the situation with ABN 
Amro in 2010. That time both agencies were asked whether the bank chief and former Fi-
nance Minister Gerrit Zalm was appropriate for the position. The central bank concluded that 
he was but the Authority for Financial Markets had an opposite thought. And the problem was 
that the Dutch “Twin Peaks” had no mechanism to deal with the situation when both financial 
regulators could not reach an agreement about an issue. For solving that particular case the 
Ministry of Finance had to set a commission in order to solve the issue. The Dutch public and 
financial authorities admitted that there was a problem and to deal with it they had incorpo-
rated the system of the leading supervisor in certain areas. However, the need for an agree-
ment between the regulators still remains. In addition, the 2011 report of Dutch Institute for 
Public Expenditure Studies concluded that in fields where it’s not clear which supervisor had 
a lead role, there was a risk of overlap when both regulators act. Also it could happen that 
something would not be covered as each supervisor might think that other would deal with it. 
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In practice, the Dutch public and financial authorities are working now on improving the 
financial regulation and supervision model. For instance, the central bank has taken the proac-
tive and conclusive way of regulation (by establishing an enforcement policy department 
within the bank). Also, the macroprudential line of the model has been straightened by the 
creation of the department of macroprudential supervision within the Financial Stability Divi-
sion of the Netherlands Central Bank. At the same time the range of macroprudential regula-
tion tools has been expended. In addition, the extension of the regulation frameworks has 
eliminated the arbitrage between banks and non-banks (i.e. the regulation of shadow banking 
has been straightened). Moreover, the “Covenant” agreement has been improved for the sake 
of reducing the possibility of the conflict between the regulators and enhancing the coopera-
tion and information sharing. 
Thus, the Netherland experience shows that separating prudential and conduct-of-business 
regulations makes sense and can work well in practice. At the same time, the combination of 
micro- and macroprudential supervision could improve the overall level of prudential supervi-
sion. Also such kind of agency could be better in crisis management. In addition, “Twin Peaks” 
allows in practice to avoid a situation when one agency overpowers another one. And lastly, 
the resent crisis showed in practice the strengths of the model. 
Summing up the theoretical overview of the model several conclusions can be made. First, 
theoretically, on the paper, the “Twin Peaks” model seems to be an effective tool to manage 
the current challenges on the financial market.  Second, having appeared in the mid nineties 
of twenty century, the model keeps developing and evolving to fit the contemporary require-
ments to financial regulation and supervision. Third, the model is flexible and may be adopted 
to some particular realities or used partly. 
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From the look at practice using of the model in the Netherland some outputs can be derived. 
First, the practical solvency of the model was proved by the recent financial crisis. Second, it 
is possible on practice to clearly distribute the duties, the power and the responsibilities of the 
regulation agencies. Third, the communication and cooperation between agencies have an im-
portant role in the full utilization of the model benefits. 
It is worth mentioning that there is a real both theoretical and practical design challenge at 
these days. The question is how to link micro-prudential supervision with macro-prudential 
and with monetary policy. This issue is more in policy field and requires a kind of policy in-
novation. 
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
I have data on the banking regulation quality as well as on the structure of the banking su-
pervision for 143 countries during the period from 2004 till 2011(see Appendix A). All the 
relevant quantitative data I have taken from the World Bank database. My empirical approach 
consists of regression analysis in order to explain the quality of banking supervision as a func-
tion of the regulatory architecture, controlling for other explanatory variables, in the case of 
my study, the level of economic development (GDP per capita). 
As the concept of banking regulation quality is quite broad, in order to cover it fully I have 
incorporated into my research four measures of the regulation quality as proxies, using the 
World Bank classification: Financial institutions efficiency; Financial institution stability; 
Credit depth of information and Strength of legal right (see Table 4).  
Regulation and supervision of the banking system have a direct influence on the efficiency 
of the financial institutions it is assumed.34Thus, the Index of Financial institutions efficiency 
can be used as a proxy of the quality of banking regulation with respect to financial institu-
tions efficiency and as consequently to overall financial market efficiency. 
One of the main goals of banking regulation and supervision is to take care about financial 
institutions stability (i.e. safeness and soundness). At that, the Index of Financial institutions 
stability is used as a proxy to measure the quality of banking regulation with respect to ensure 
the stability of financial institutions and as consequently  to overall financial market stability. 
Another important goal of banking regulation is to struggle with the matters of information 
asymmetry and transparency on the financial market. In order to measure the quality of bank-
ing regulation in the field, the Index of Credit depth of information is used as a proxy to show 
                                                          
34Fotios Pasiouras , Sailesh Tanna, and Constantin Zopounidis. "The Impact Of Banking Regulations On Banks' 
Cost And Profit Efficiency: Cross-country Evidence." International Review of Financial Analysis 18, no. 5 (2009): 
294-302, 2009. 
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how regulation deals with the issues of the scope, accessibility, and quality of information on 
the credit market. 
Lastly, in order to determine the banking regulation and supervision quality in the field of 
the protection of the rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending (i.e. consumer 
protection) the Index of Strength of legal right is used as a proxy measurement. 
In order to measure Financial institutions efficiency and Financial institution stability I 
calculated aggregate indexes across countries and explanatory indicators, based on relevant 
data from World Bank database “Global financial development.”  Although that database is 
quite informative, some countries do not have data on some explanatory indicators. In such 
cases I had to use aggregate regional indicators. The level of each explanatory indicator is 
transformed into a numerical value from 10 (the best case) to 1 (the worse case) and an aggre-
gate index is calculated as a simple average of equally weighted explanatory principles in-
cluded in a given component.  All indexes are calculated in line with the OECD methodolo-
gy.35 It is worth mentioning that generally speaking my job was only to convert data to one 1-
10 scale using the internationally accepted benchmark measurements (for instance Basel core 
principles, aggregate numbers for developed countries, etc. ) for each explanatory variable 
and then to calculate equally weighted indexes.  
For Credit depth of information and Strength of legal right I use indexes calculated by 
World Bank from its database “World development indicators.”  Table 4 shows the indicators 
used to calculate indexes and theirs short description in terms of the study. 
Table 4 Banking regulation and its four main quality indexes 
Four main 
indexes36 
 
Explanatory indicators 
 
Description 
Source 
Financial 
institutions 
efficiency 
Cost to income ratio; Credit to government 
and state-owned enterprises to GDP; Lend-
ing-deposit spread; Net interest margin; 
Non-interest income to total income; Over-
To measure the banking 
regulation through the effi-
ciency of the financial insti-
tutions 
Global financial 
development da-
tabase, World 
Bank 
                                                          
35Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008. 
36 In its turns all of them are indicated and classified by World bank, and are taken from the World bank data-
bases 
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head costs to total assets 
Financial 
institution 
stability 
Bank Z-score; Bank capital to total assets; 
Bank credit to bank deposits; Bank non-
performing loans to gross loans; Liquid 
assets to deposits and short term funding; 
Provisions to non-performing loans; Regu-
latory capital to risk-weighted assets 
To measure the banking 
regulation through the 
soundness of the financial 
institutions 
Global financial 
development da-
tabase, World 
Bank 
Credit depth 
of information 
Aggregated by World Bank To measure the banking 
regulation in the field of the 
scope, accessibility, and 
quality of information on 
the credit market 
World develop-
ment indicators 
database, World 
Bank 
Strength of 
legal right 
Aggregated by World Bank To measure the banking 
regulation in the field of the 
protection the rights of bor-
rowers and lenders and thus 
facilitate lending 
World develop-
ment indicators, 
World Bank 
 
In order to examine the impact of the use of the “Twin Peaks” model on the quality of 
banking regulation I have introduced a “Twin Peaks dummy” that takes a value of “1” for 
countries with this model in use for each observed year (as shown in Appendix A) and “0” for 
all other banking supervision models. To find some particular countries with the model “in 
use” I use theoretical and empirical studies of Čihák and Podpiera (2006, 2007, 2008), 
Kremers and Schoenmaker (2003, 2010), Masciandaro (2006) and others; reports and papers 
of G-30 (2008, 2009) and IMF (2011), and other sources (see Appendix B). 
Taking into account the above mentioned, the used variables for the empirical study is 
summarized in the following table. 
Table 5 Used Variables 
Variable Observation Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Country 0     
Year 1144 2007.5 2.29229 2004 2011 
Financial institutions efficiency in-
dex 
1144 6.658173 1.30277 2.3333 9.6667 
Financial institution stability index 1144 6.54237 0.7575241 3.5714 8.4286 
Credit depth of information index 1144 5.602364 3.249155 1 10 
Strength of legal right index 1144 5.571004 2.439443 1 10 
GDP per capita 1144 13249.61 18376.48 138.3676 114231.8 
Twin Peaks dummy 1144 0.0480769 0.2140224 0 1 
Log GDP per capita 1144 8.46939 1.562756 4.929914 11.64598 
Country1 1144 72 41.29759 1 143 
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In such a way, with a purpose of getting some numerical evidence to prove my hypothesis, 
and in order to find the relationship between the quality of the banking regulation and banking 
supervision structure I used the quantitative methods, namely the method of regression analy-
sis. As I have data for several time periods and for different countries, the type of my data is 
panel data.  
The methodology: simple/multiple regression models (Y = α + βX1+ε) 
In order to estimate the relation between banking supervision quality and the “Twin Peaks” 
model:    
– A regulation quality indexit = α + β(Twin Peaks dummy it)+ε; 
For the sake of controlling my dummy variable I incorporated a log of GDP per capita to 
my regression model. The respective data of countries GDP (most recent) were taken from 
World Bank database. There were no data available for some countries. In that case the 
average amounts were calculated.  
– A regulation quality indexit = α + β1 (Twin Peaks dummy it) + β2 (log of GDP per capita it) + 
ε; 
Such a methodological approach is used for each of the components. Thus, I have two re-
gressions model for each of four components. 
It is important to mention that the technique of assessment and conversion, which were 
used in the study, are not scientifically exact. So, some obvious limitation appears. For in-
stance, doing best to be as objective as possible in converting and assessing data there is still 
room for subjectivity depending on the used tools, techniques and researcher’s experience, etc. 
Other limitation is in the nature of regulation quality itself, as there are some elements that are 
difficult to quantify. Also using proxy variables we need to bear in mind that they may not 
fully reflect main variables. 
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V.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The outputs of the regressions show that generally on average the using of the “Twin Peaks” 
model has an economical and statistical significant positive relationship with the overall level 
of the banking regulation and supervision quality only partly. It means that the quality of the 
banking regulation and supervision does not depend only on the architecture of the regulation 
system. In additional, using of the “Twin Peaks” model itself cannot ensure the high quality 
of financial regulation and supervision. 
Table 6 Summarized regressions outputs 
Banking regulation 
quality Index 
Constant Twin Peaks 
Dummy 
Log GDP 
Per cap. 
No of 
Observ. 
R2 P>F= 
 
 
Financial institution 
stability 
6.52** 
(0.01) 
0.39** 
(0.14) 
- 1144 0.02 0.006 
 
3.12** 
(0.47) 
 
0.36** 
(0.14) 
 
0.40** 
(0.05) 
 
1144 
 
0.1 
 
0.000 
 
 
Financial institutions 
efficiency 
6.62** 
(0.01) 
0.60** 
(0.16) 
- 1144 0.04 0.000 
 
1.97** 
(0.54) 
 
0.55** 
(0.16) 
 
0.54** 
(0.06) 
 
1144 
 
0.3 
 
0.000 
 
 
Credit depth of in-
formation 
5.59* 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.42) 
- 1144 0.04 0.880 
 
-17.4* 
(1.19) 
 
-0.17 
(0.35) 
 
2.72* 
(0.14) 
 
1144 
 
0.24 
 
0.000 
 
 
Strength of legal 
right 
5.55* 
(0.02) 
0.25 
(0.19) 
- 1144 0.01 0.195 
 
-1.28* 
(0.62) 
 
0.18 
(0.18) 
 
0.80** 
(0.07) 
 
1144 
 
0.09 
 
0.000 
Notes: **/* denotes significance level of 1/5 %. Standard errors in parentheses. Fixed effects. 
In particular, I was able to observe the only two both statistically and economically signifi-
cant, positive relations. At first, the relation between the model and the quality of banking su-
pervision, measured  by the index of Financial institutions efficiency, has positive, strong 
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economically and statistically significant character (see the Table 6). This results hold even 
after controlling by the level of economic development (see the Table 6). 
At second, the quality of banking regulation and supervision with respect to stability of the 
system, measured by the index of Financial institutions stability, is positively and highly sta-
tistically and economically significant with the particular model of financial regulation and 
supervision. This result hold even after taking into account (adjusting) the cross-country dif-
ferences in the economic development level, indicated by per capita GDP (see the Table 6)  
In terms of the relations between the model and the banking regulation quality measured 
by Credit depth of information index and Strength of legal right index respectively, my study 
shows that there is no economically or statistically significant  connection between dependent 
and independent variables at all (see the Table 6).  
The results of my analysis are correct when the impact of the “Twin peaks” model on the 
quality of the banking supervision is compared with the impact of other supervisory models: 
all the dummy variables identifying the “Twin Peaks” model in a simple regression on the 
four components of the banking regulation (as defined in Section 3).  
In addition, regressions’ outputs show that there are some other factors, except the regula-
tion structure, which have a large impact on the quality of the banking supervision. This is 
confirmed by the large value of the alpha coefficient of each regression’s output.  
Thus, my hypothesis about the existence of positive statistically significant relationship be-
tween the model of banking regulation, namely the “Twin Peaks” model, and the quality of 
banking supervision can be accepted to some extent. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
My empirical results suggest several conclusions to discuss: 
 The “Twin Peaks” model has a partial impact on the overall banking regulation quali-
ty compare to other types of supervisory structures, with regards to the used measures 
of the banking supervision performance; 
 Only in case of financial institutions efficiency and financial institutions soundness, 
as respective and separate measures of the quality of the banking regulation,- the 
model tends to be characterized by a better quality of banking regulation than other 
models, even after adjusting for cross-country difference in GDP per capita; 
 There are some other factors which have a large impact on the quality of the banking 
supervision; 
 In order to study such an issue it is better to use some specific measures of banking 
supervision quality (for instance Basel Core Principles compliance) rather than proxy 
indicators which cannot fully explain the performance of banking regulation; 
However, we should look at the above analysis interpretation through the prism of some 
limitations in the models, namely – the first limitation is the sample size, which does not al-
low us to make a certain conclusion about the whole world tendency as there is still room for 
some quantity changes; the second one is the lack of some countries’ data which made me 
apply the regional average data; the third one is the possibility of missing some important fac-
tors which might have had  huge impacts on the current result.  
To this end, we can conclude that our research analysis shows the result of the partly statis-
tically significant relation between the quality of the banking regulation and using of the 
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“Twin Peaks” supervision model, which, however, needs to be made more precise by adding 
some other explanatory factors.
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Appendix A. List of countries includes in the empirical estima-
tion 
    
  
Country  
Name 
TP 
 mod-
el   
Country  
Name 
TP 
 mod-
el   
Country  
Name 
TP 
 mod-
el   
Country  
Name 
TP 
 mod-
el 
1 Albania 
 
38 Estonia 
 
75 Lithuania 
 
112 Serbia   
2 Algeria 
 
39 Ethiopia 
 
76 Luxembourg 
 
113 Seychelles   
3 Angola 
 
40 Finland 
 
77 Macedonia, FYR 114 Sierra Leone   
4 Argentina 
 
41 France X 78 Madagascar 
 
115 Singapore   
5 Armenia 
 
42 Gabon 
 
79 Malawi 
 
116 Slovak Republic   
6 Australia X 43 Gambia, The 
 
80 Malaysia 
 
117 Slovenia   
7 Austria 
 
44 Georgia 
 
81 Mali 
 
118 South Africa X* 
8 Azerbaijan 
 
45 Germany X* 82 Malta 
 
119 Spain X 
9 Bahrain 
 
46 Ghana 
 
83 Mauritania 
 
120 Sri Lanka   
10 Bangladesh 
 
47 Greece 
 
84 Mauritius 
 
121 Suriname   
11 Belarus 
 
48 Grenada 
 
85 Mexico 
 
122 Swaziland   
12 Belgium X 49 Guatemala 
 
86 Moldova 
 
123 Sweden   
13 Belize 
 
50 Guinea 
 
87 Mongolia 
 
124 Switzerland   
14 Bhutan 
 
51 Guyana 
 
88 Morocco 
 
125 Syrian Arab Republic 
15 Bolivia 
 
52 Haiti 
 
89 Mozambique 
 
126 Tajikistan   
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina 53 Honduras 
 
90 Namibia 
 
127 Tanzania   
17 Botswana 
 
54 Hong Kong SAR, China 91 Nepal 
 
128 Thailand   
18 Brazil 
 
55 Hungary 
 
92 Netherlands X 129 Togo   
19 Brunei Darussalam 56 Iceland 
 
93 New Zealand 
 
130 Trinidad and Tobago 
20 Bulgaria 
 
57 India 
 
94 Nicaragua 
 
131 Tunisia   
21 Cambodia 
 
58 Indonesia 
 
95 Nigeria 
 
132 Turkey   
22 Cameroon 
 
59 Ireland 
 
96 Norway 
 
133 Uganda   
23 Canada X* 60 Israel 
 
97 Oman 
 
134 Ukraine   
24 Central African Republic 61 Italy X 98 Pakistan 
 
135 
United Arab 
Emirates   
25 Chile 
 
62 Jamaica 
 
99 Panama 
 
136 
United King-
dom X* 
26 China 
 
63 Japan 
 
100 Papua New Guinea 137 United States X* 
27 Colombia 
 
64 Jordan 
 
101 Paraguay 
 
138 Uruguay   
28 Costa Rica 
 
65 Kazakhstan 
 
102 Peru 
 
139 Uzbekistan   
29 Cote d'Ivoire 
 
66 Kenya 
 
103 Philippines 
 
140 Venezuela, RB   
30 Croatia 
 
67 Korea, Rep. 
 
104 Poland 
 
141 Vietnam   
31 Cyprus 
 
68 Kuwait 
 
105 Portugal X 142 Yemen, Rep.   
32 Czech Republic 
 
69 Kyrgyz Republic 
 
106 Qatar 
 
143 Zambia   
33 Denmark 
 
70 Lao PDR 
 
107 Romania 
   
  
34 Dominica 
 
71 Latvia 
 
108 Russian Federation 
  
  
35 Dominican Republic 72 Lebanon 
 
109 Rwanda 
   
  
36 Ecuador 
 
73 Lesotho 
 
110 Saudi Arabia 
   
  
37 Egypt, Arab Rep.   74 Libya   111 Senegal         
*The model is used partly and mainly after Global financial crisis, 2007 
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Appendix B. List of countries with the launched «Twin Peaks» model 
 
Country Year Source 
Australia 1998 Bakir, Caner. “The governance of financial regulatory reform: the Australian experience.” 
Public Administration Vol. 87, No. 4, 2009 (910–922).  
 
Belgium 2010 Belgian Prime News No. 51 March 2011 
Canada 1987 Wymeersch, Eddy. The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About single, twin 
peaks and multiple financial supervisors. Ghent University - Financial Law Institute; 
ECGI, 2006. 
France 2010 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The Financial Crisis, reform 
and exit strategies.2009 
 
Germany 2010 Vletter-van Dort, Hélène M. “Some Challenges Facing European Central Banks as Super-
vising Authority.” European Company and Financial Law Review. Volume 9, Issue 2, 
Pages 131–155, July 2012. 
 
Italy 1999 Wymeersch, Eddy. The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About single, twin 
peaks and multiple financial supervisors. Ghent University - Financial Law Institute; 
ECGI, 2006. 
Netherland 2002 Kremers, Jeroen and Dirk Schoenmaker. Twin Peaks: Experiences in the Netherlands. 
LSE financial markets group. November, 2010.  
Portugal 2000 Wymeersch, Eddy. The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About single, twin 
peaks and multiple financial supervisors. Ghent University - Financial Law Institute; 
ECGI, 2006. 
South Af-
rica 
2011 Implementing twin peaks regulation in South Africa 
South Africa Goverment information 
Spain 2010 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The Financial Crisis, reform 
and exit strategies.2009 
 
United 
Kingdom 
2011 The Financial Services Bill (the Bill), which was published in draft form in June 2011 
United 
States 
2010 Wymeersch, Eddy. The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About single, twin 
peaks and multiple financial supervisors. Ghent University - Financial Law Institute; 
ECGI, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
